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ARTICLES
THE PAPER CHASE: SHOULD THE PRINCIPLES
OF CONTRACT LAW GOVERN ERISA SECTION

302?
Max Birmingham*
INTRODUCTION

This article addresses whether a collective bargaining agreement
(hereinafter "CBA") shields an employer from performing its obligations
under Section 302 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(hereinafter "ERISA"), 1 or whether an employer must make additional
contributions when a pension plan fails to meet minimum funding requirements.
The Supreme Court of the United States (hereinafter "SCOTUS")
observes that ERISA was enacted "to promote the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans ' 2 and "to protect contractually defined benefits ....

."I

SCOTUS further elaborates that "[i]n

enacting ERISA, Congress' primary concern was with the mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure
to pay employees benefits from accumulated funds."4 This Congressional
concern stems from labor union corruption, in which investigations

B.S., State University of New York at Empire State College; M.B.A., Northeastern University
D'Amore-McKim School of Business; J.D./M.J., Michigan State University College of Law. The
Author would like to thank Maria Filipakis; Professor Bruce Bean, Michigan State University College
of Law; Irna N. Kashcheyeva, Foley & Lamder, LLP; and last but certainly not least, the editors,
staff, and faculty advisors of the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal.
L. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 302, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b) (1982).
2. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
3. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (emphasis added).
4. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989).
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unearthed bribes, cronyism, kickbacks, looting, and other inappropriate
conduct in employee pension and benefit plans.5
The benefit plans and pension plans covered by ERISA are collective
bargaining agreements. 6 SCOTUS holds that "....

collective-bargaining

agreements, including those establishing ERISA plans, [shall be interpreted] accordingto ordinaryprinciplesof contractlaw... ."' According
to ordinary contract principles, contract interpretation always begins with
the plain meaning rule.8 The plain meaning rule excludes extrinsic evidence,9 which elucidates the intentions of the contracting parties. 0 The
first step in applying the plain meaning rule is to analyze the contractual
language and determine if it is either plain and clear or ambiguous.'" A
it is reasonably susceptible to more than
contract is not ambiguous unless
2
one reasonable interpretation.1
In Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. DoradoBeach Hotel
Corp. (hereinafter "Gastronomical Workers"), the First Circuit completely ignores ordinary principles of contract law, despite acknowledging

5.

See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGING U.S. SENATE, 98TH CONG.,

THE EMPLOYEE

RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE, at 10-11 (Comm. Print 1984); see
also John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Errorin
Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1324 (2003) (discussing congressional
investigations conducted during the 1950s and 1960s).
6. Mona N. Glanzer, The Impact of ERISA on Collective Bargaining,52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
531, 533 (1978).
7. M&G Polymers USA v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427,435 (2015) (emphasis added).
8.

3 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE

WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW, § 542, at 100 (1960); 9 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW, § 2461, at 196 (1981); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS, § 609, at 402 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3rd ed. 1961).
9.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 474 (3rd ed. 1990) ("Many courts, particu-

larly in cases decided in the first half of the twentieth century, agreed that ...[i]f, on its face, the
agreement appears to be completely integrated, the court should simply accept that this is so.").
10. See Rickman v. Carstairs (1833) 110 Eng. Rep. 930, 935; 5 B. & Ad. 651, 662-63 ("Unfortunately, however, they have used words which will not, we think, effectuate that intention. The question in this and other cases of construction of written instruments is, not what was the intention of the
parties, but what is the meaning of the words they have used.").
11. The plain meaning doctrine holds that the ambiguity must be discoverable on a bare or
literal reading of the text, and without referring to extrinsic sources. Harry W. Jones, The Plain
Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 11
(1939); see also Appalachian Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 529 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(finding that a party to an unambiguous contract cannot seek evidence outside of the agreement in
order to make an argument that the contract is ambiguous), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
12. Continental Bus Sys. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 267, 273 (10th Cir. 1963) ("If the language of the
contract is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should construe the contract in the
light of the situation and relation of the parties at the time it was made, and, if possible, accord it a
reasonable and sensible meaning, consonant with its dominant purpose.").
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that "pension contribution obligations are contractual in nature," 3 and
holds that an employer may need to contribute to a pension plan to meet
minimum funding'requirements even if it goes beyond what is required in
the collective bargaining agreement. 14 The GastronomicalWorkers Court
did not reason that the contractual language is unclear or ambiguous.. 5
Surreptitiously, the Court is silent on whether the contractual language is
plain and clear or ambiguous, giving rise to the inference that the contract
is plain and clear. 6 If the Court finds that the coitractual language is
ambiguous, it is presumable that it would have declared so in its opinion
to bolster its analysis. 7 In a cursory analysis of contract law, with regard
to the plain meaning rule, the Court says that "this tenet does not exist in
18
a vacuum."
This article argues that a valid, enforceable contract does allow an
employer to shield itself from ERISA liability under Section 302 simply
by performing its obligations.19 To hold otherwise violates ordinary principles of contract law. 20 Moreover, the Gastronomical Workers decision
may lead to reductio ad absurdum.2t
This argument proceeds as follows. It begins with an introduction.
Section I examines the purpose of ERISA and explores both congressional
23
22
and judicial interpretations of the statute. Section II analyzes case law.
Section III interprets other ERISA sections, similar statutes, and other
principles of law as to why principles of contract law are appropriate to
guide the analysis of certain ERISA sections.24 Section IV explores why
principles of contract law are applicable in ERISA cases.25 Section V
identifies why not applying principles of contract law to ERISA cases is
subject to reductio ad absurdum.26 The final section concludes this argument.27
13. Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 62
(1st Cir. 2010).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 62.
16. Id. (finding that the document "makes clear that the trustees lack the power to enlarge those
obligations").
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at62.
19. See infra Section IV.
20. See infra Section III.
21., See infra Section V.
22. See infra Section I.
23. See infra Section II.
24. See infra Section III.
25. See infra Section IV.
26. See infra Section V.
27. See infra Conclusion.
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UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF ERISA

There is a general consensus that the Congress passed ERISA with
28
to create a uniform body of law that provides federal remedies
intent
the
to employees who have been unjustly deprived of their benefit plans and
pension plans.2 9 The purpose of pension plans is to provide income to
employees in their retirement.30 Generally, pension plans either help an
employee save funds for their retirement or promise an employee a defined amount of income in their retirement.31 In 1985, the Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations
of the Committee on Education and Labor of the U.S. House of Representatives issued a report that chronicled a story about an employer who
terminated its pension plan in order to capture excess assets and substantially reduced the pension plan without notifying the employee.32 Said
employee expected to receive a pension plan of $800 a month but instead
was going to receive $300 a month. 33 Thus, the employee was left with a
shortfall of $6,000 that he was counting on in his retirement.34
The purpose of benefit plans is to provide welfare programs in an
array of areas, such as medical, health, accident, day-care services, scholarship funds, or legal services.35 It is noteworthy that pension plans are
36
subject to more regulation than benefit plans.

28. According to both the Senate and House Committee reports, Congress intended for ERISA
to provide "the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts"
and ERISA's "enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the Secretary
and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of
[ERISA]." H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4369,4655; S.
REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973).
29. 120 CONG. REC.29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits (D-NY)) ("It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare andpensionplans.") (emphasis added).

30.

See Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 302(2)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C.

§ 1002(2)(A)(i) (2012).
31. See generally Overfunded Pension Plans:Joint HearingBefore the Select Comm. on Aging
& the Subcomm. on Lab. Mgmt. Relations of the Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 99th Cong., 4 (1985)

[hereinafter Hearings](opening statement of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman).
32.

Id. at 33; see also Richard A. Ippolito, Issues Surrounding Pension Terminationsfor Re-

version, 5 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 81, 83-87 (1986) (asserting that the termination of pension plans harms
workers).
33. Hearings,supra note 31, at 39.
34. Id.
35. See ERISA § 302 (1)(A).
36. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,192 (1974) (statement of Congressman Carl D. Perkins, Chairman
of the House Lab. and Educ. Committee) ("Mr. Speaker, to summarize what is being done today let
me state - after years of study and investigation, hearings and debate, after endless hours of work,
pension reform legislation of an historic character is almost complete.") (emphasis added).
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Before ERISA was enacted, there was a farrago of state regulation
covering this field.37 As such, this marks the first time that federal remedies were made available to employees who have claims of being unjustly
deprived of their benefit plans and pension plans.3 8 To ensure uniformity,
the Congress declares that the ERISA statute "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan," covered by ERISA.39
A.

CongressionallyDeclaredPurposes ofERISA

At the time ERISA was signed into law, there was consternation
amongst the general public as incidents of fraud with pension plans were
occurring across the nation.4 ° In 1972, following a reports of abuse and
fraud in pension plans across the nation, 4 1 Congress passed a series of resolutions to examine the pension system.42 Employees who dedicated their
life to a single employer were losing their pensions.43 Senator Jacob Javits
(D-NY) noted that there were several instances in which beneficiaries who
were unfamiliar with the terms of their pension plans had lost entitlements
to expected benefits.4 4
Shortly after ERISA was signed into law, Senator Javits observed:
The problem, as perceived by those who were with me on this issue in
the Congress, was how to maintain the voluntary growth of private plans
while at the same time making needed structural reforms in such areas

37. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGING U.S. SENATE, supra note 5, at 8 (remarking that the
Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, passed in 1958, does not provide any federal
remedies).
38. Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018).
40. 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-NJ)) (noting
that ERISA is designed not just to protect pension benefits, but also to protect and regulate the administration of welfare benefits).
41. See generally S. REP. No. 93-127, at 1-7 (1973) (discussing the history of abuses in private
pension systems and attempts by the Congress to remedy said abuses through legislation); see also
120 CONG. REc. 29,934 (1974) (remarks by Sen. Jacob K. Javits (D-NY)) (indicating that an absence
of oversight of private pension funds has led to the need for legislation).
42. S.REP. No.92-235, at 11 (1972); S.REP. No. 93-127, at 1 (1973); see also 120 CONG. REC.
29,929 (1974) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-NJ)), Chairman of Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare) (indicating that the Committee's study was initiated pursuant to resolution of the 91 st Congress).
43. 120 CONG. REC. 29,949 (1974) (statement of Sen. Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. (D-TX)) (citing
the instance of a woman who had lost her pension on a technicality - and further insisting that ERISA
should prevent similar economic tragedies in the future).
44. 120 CONG. REc. 29,934-35 (1974).
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as vesting, funding, termination, etc., so as to safeguard workers against
loss of their earned or anticipated benefits - which was their principal
cause of complaint and which-over the years-had led to widespread frustration and bitterness * * * the new law represents an overall effort to
strike a balance between the clearly-demonstrated needs of workers for
greater protection and the desirability of avoiding the homogenization
of pension plans into a federally-dictated structure that would discour45
age voluntary initiatives for further expansion and improvement.
Holding that the main goal of ERISA is to protect the pension plans
and benefit plans of employees, 46 the Congress was cognizant of the financial and administrative burdens that ERISA may impose. 47 The House
Committee on Labor opines:
The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension
rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans. The relative improvements required by this Act have been weighed against the additional burdens to
be placed on the system. While modest cost increases are to be anticipated when the Act becomes effective, the adverse impact of these increases has been minimized. Additionally, all of the provisions in the
Act have been analyzed on the basis of their projected48 costs in relation
to the anticipated benefit to the employee participant.
Senator Nelson went on to remark:
In all its deliberations and decisions, Congress was acutely aware that
under our voluntary pension system the cost of financing pension plans
is an important factor in determining whether a pension plan will be
adopted. Unduly large increases in cost can impede the progress of the
private pension system. For this reason, in the case of those requirements
which add to the cost of financing pension plans, Congress tried to adopt
provisions which strike a balance between providing a meaningful

45. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGING U.S. SENATE, supra note 5, at 25.
46. Robert A. Cohen, UnderstandingPreemption Removal under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 578, 589 (1997); see also S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4846 (1974) ("[A] major issue in private pension
plans relates to the adequacy of plan funding ...The promise and commitment of a pension can be
fulfilled only when funds are available to pay the employee participant what is owed to him. Without
adequate funding, a promise of a pension which may be illusory and empty.").
47. Cohen, supra note 46, at 594, 613; see generally S. REP. No. 93-127, at 4839 (1974).
48. Cohen, supra note 46, at 613.
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protection for the
employees and keeping costs within reasonable limits
49
for employers.

B. JudiciallyDeclaredPurposes of ERISA
Notwithstanding, there are varying interpretations of the extent to
which ERISA protects employees and when remedies are available. Several courts have elucidated their viewpoints on the comprehensiveness of
the protections ERISA affords employees.5" SCOTUS maintains that the
purpose of ERISA is to protect and promote the interests of plan participants and, beneficiaries.5 1 In order to maintain the integrity of this purpose, the scope of ERISA's preemption extends to state community property laws, particularly those with encompassing testamentary
instruments. 2 The Second Circuit contends that the purpose of ERISA is
to protect employee benefits and to promote the growth of pension plans.53
The Second Circuit further elaborates that ERISA is meant to protect employees from losing their jobs, and also to guerdon employees for their
service." The Third Circuit holds that the purpose of ERISA is to protect

employee benefits and to proselytize the growth of pension plans.55 The
Sixth Circuit states that the purpose of ERISA is to develop a uniform
body of federal law, which in turn curtails the administrative and financial
burdens of employers.56 The Ninth Circuit interprets the purpose of
ERISA as ensuring that workers actually receive their benefit plans and
pension plans in their retirement.5 7 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York promulgates that the purpose of ERISA

49. SuBcoMM. ON LAB. OF THE COMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HIST. OF THE EMP. RETIREMENT INCOME SEC. ACT of 1974, at 4800 (Comm. Print
1976); see also Cohen, supra note 46, at 613.
50. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 836 (1997); Muse v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 103
F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1996); Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 507 (2d Cir. 1995);
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994); Bradwell v. GAF
Corp., 954 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1992).
51. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845.
52. Id. at 852-53.
53. See Siskind, 47 F.3d at 503; see also Bradwell, 954 F.2d at 801.
54. See Bradwell, 954 F.2d at 80 1.
55. See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 240 (McKelvie, dissenting) ("One of Congress' primary purposes
for enacting ERISA is 'to protect contractually defined benefits."') (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
56. See Muse v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Richard
Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV. 631, 632 (1994) (noting
that ERISA reflects balance between encouraging further pension plan formation and protecting benefit interests of employees).
57. See Michael v. Riverside Cement Co. Pension Plan, 266 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001).
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is to reward employees for past service to their employers and to protect
employees from the economic hardship of unemployment.5 8
The central purpose of ERISA is to encourage the growth of pension
plans5 9 and safeguard the benefit plans of employees.6" From the enumerated objectives of the enactment of ERISA, to the remarks of Congress
and court cases, the constant theme of employees being granted relief is
fraud. 61 Specifically, employees being dispossessed of their rightful pension plans and benefit plans.6 2 It is unfathomable to presume that Congress ever intended for employees to be able to avail themselves to seek
remedy with regard to their pension plans or benefit plans if said employ63
ees negotiated it away in a collective bargaining agreement. This is because the employees would have received consideration in a collective
bargaining agreement and willfully decided to forgo a part of their pension
plan or benefit plan in order to obtain something that they placed a higher
value on.64

58. See Bennett v. Gill & Duffus Chems., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("In
addition, we must note that severance benefits serve two purposes. Severance pay can be given to
reward past service to a company as well as to provide protection against future unemployment.").
59. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 538-39 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Although
Congress sought to guarantee that employees receive the welfare benefits promised by employers,
Congress was also aware that if the cost of providing welfare benefits rose too high, employers would
not provide them at all."); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 n. 17 (1985) (warning
against expanding liability beyond that intended by Congress, "lest the cost offederal standardsdiscourage the growth ofjprivate pension plans") (emphasis added); see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,949
(1974); H.R. REP.No. 93-533, at 1 (1973).
60. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112-13 (1989) ("ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974 to safeguard employees from the abuse and mismanagement of funds that had been
accumulated to finance various types of employee benefits. The 'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' contains elaborate provisions for the regulation of employee benefit plans.") (citations omitted);
see also Jay Conison, Suits ForBenefits Under ERISA, 54 U. Ptr. L. REv. 1, 3 (1992).
61. See generally Conison, supra note 60, at 42 ("[Jjudicial review of benefit denials 'does lie
where applicants can show a breach of fiduciary trust, fraud or arbitrary action.' The court thus understood the rule as a trust-law rule for protecting employees.").
62. See id. at 44.
63. See generally M&G Polymers USA v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 435 (2015) ("[T]he rule that
contractual 'provisions ordinarily should be enforced as written is especially appropriate when enforcing an ERISA [welfare benefits] plan."') (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
64. See id. at 441.
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II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A.

GastronomicalWorkers Union Local 610 v. DoradoBeach
Hotel Corp.
1. United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico

The trustees of the Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 & Metropolitan Hotel Association Pension Fund (hereinafter "the Fund"), a
multi-employer pension plan, brought suit against a number of contributing employers to obtain additional contributions necessary to eliminate
65
a funding deficiency for the 2005 plan year.
The Federal District mistakenly analogized the case before it with
CentralPennsylvania Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line,
Inc. (hereinafter "Central Pennsylvania Teamsters"), a case from the
Third Circuit.66 The Federal District proclaims the Third Circuit barred
the employers from making a contract defense,6 7 but this is because the
68
Third Circuit holds that the plain language of the CBA is not at issue.
CentralPennsylvania Teamsters is not applicable to this case because it
is a party trying to enforce a contract by relying on plain language that
was the result of a mutual mistake in drafting. 69 Ironically, the Third Circuit holds that third party beneficiaries are allowed to enforce the plain
language of the CBA, regardless of a mutual mistake in contract drafting.70 Thus, this seems to favor the employers argument. 7 If the plain
language of the CBA is enforceable, it would mean that the employers are
not required to fund additional contributions necessary to eliminate a
funding deficiency for the 2005 plan year.72 Both parties filed cross-motions for summaryjudgment.7 3 The Federal Disfrict Court ended up ruling
in favor of the trustees, granting their motion and holding that the

65. See Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp.; 476 F. Supp.
2d 99, 103 (D.P.R. 2007).
66. See id. at 106.
67. See id.
68. See Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v.'McCormick.Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 1105
(3d Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 1099.
70. Id. at 1099-1100.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1105; see also GastronomicalWorkers, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
73. See Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 85 F.3d at 1102.
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employers were pro rata liable under Section 302 for the amounts necessary to cure the 2005 funding deficiency.74
2.

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

The employers appealed the decision of the Federal District Court. 7
The employers make four arguments, which the court rejects. 76 However,
there are severe deficiencies with the court's analysis of the employers'
arguments.7 7
a.

Ripeness

The employer's first argument is that the matter is not ripe because
the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") did not decide on their
application regarding a funding waiver.78 In 2006, the Fund requested a
minimum funding waiver for the contributions required for 2005.79 The
80
IRS had not acted on said request as of the date of the court's opinion.
Since the IRS did not decide on the aforementioned application, the
employers claim that there is no injury." The Court held a different viewpoint, opining that the events giving rise to the funding deficiency were
"matters of historical fact" and that, if those facts were true, "the Fund has
suffered an injury. ' 82 The Court then offered an initial explanation, which
is petitio principii(a circular argument sometimes known as begging the
question),8 3 as to why it decides the matter is ripe. 84 In United States v.
Jannotti, Judge Aldisert declared there is a petitio principii in the

74. Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d. 54, 5960 (1st Cir. 2010).
75. Id.at 57.
76. Id. at 61-65 ("In their appeal, the employers argue that the district court erred because (i)
the suit is not ripe; (ii) the CBA foreclosed the trustees from seeking increased employer contributions; (iii) the accumulated funding deficiency was attributable to trustee mismanagement and, therefore, not properly chargeable against the employers; and (iv) the accumulated funding deficiency no
longer exists. We confront these arguments in turn.") (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id.at 58.
80. Id.
81. Id.at 59.
82. Id.at 61.
the log83. See PetitioPrincipii,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1Ith ed.2019) (explaining that
ical fallacy petitioprincipiiis sometimes known as begging the question. This logical fallacy attempts
to support a claim with a premise that itself presupposes the claim).
84. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 61.
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majority's decision.85 There, the Defendant was charged with conspiracy,
which requires an effect on interstate commerce for the federal court to
have jurisdiction.8 6 The Defendant argued that there was factual impossibility, but the majority's opinion is centered on the fact that factual impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy.87 Judge Aldisert notes that:
[T]he reasoning "cooks the books," to use Professor Neil MacCormick's
phrase, or more popularly, it puts the bunny in the hat by begging the
question in a classic petitioprincipii: Instead of proving the conclusion
(presence of federal jurisdiction), the argument assumes it and then argues substantive law: factual impossibility as a defense to the conspiracy
88

charge.

Here, the GastronomicalWorkers court states the injury is concrete,
but then admits that the IRS could very well grant the funding waiver."
If the IRS granted the funding waiver, there would be no injury.9" Since
the injury could be cured or undone depending on a future action, it is not
concrete. 91
Furtively, the Court then posits that the employers made the wrong
argument with ripeness, and that the correct argument would be standing.92 "Consequently, it is the future event, not the trustees' injury, that is
speculative. Viewed in this light, DBHC's argument is not a ripeness argument at all."93

The doctrines of standing and ripeness are directed to different concerns.94 The doctrine of standing requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
he has suffered an injury or will imminently be injured.9 5 SCOTUS elucidates that the injury must be "actual," "distinct," "palpable," and "concrete." 96 The doctrine of ripeness addresses whether the matter is ready
for review or if it is premature, as well as if the plaintiff has suffered an
injury or will imminently be injured:

85. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 626 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 580-81 (highlighting the majority opinion).
87. Id. at 626 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (citing NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 72 (1978)).
89. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d. at 61.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 62.
93. Id. at 61-62.
94. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,98 YALE L.J. 221, 222, 248 (1988).
95. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 71 (1984); see also Fletcher,
supra note 94, at 221-24.
96. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 756, 772 (1984).
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The difference between an abstract question and a 'controversy' ...is
necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise testfor determining in every case whether there
is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judg97
ment.

Theoretically, the doctrine of standing might be used to analyze
whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury, orpresent injury. 98 The doctrine of ripeness might be used to analyze whether the plaintiff will imminently suffer an injury or future injury. 99 Nonetheless, no such line of

demarcation can be found in case law. 0 One lawyer has commented that
"[i]n measuring whether the litigant has asserted an injury that is real and
concrete rather than speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness inquiry
merges almost completely with standing analysis.""1 1
Nevertheless, the First Circuit could have discussed standing even
though the Fund did not make the argument.102 Perhaps the First Circuit
103
did not feel comfortable bringing up the standing argument sua sponte,

97. Golden v. Zwiekler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) (emphasis added); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297-98 (1979).
98. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d. at 61.
99. See id. ("Consequently, it is the future event, not the trustees' injury, that is speculative.
Viewed in this light, DBHC's argument is not a ripeness argument at all.") (emphasis added).
100. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9-11, 13 (1972) (explaining that the Court characterized the
plaintiff's claim as a theoretical injury that the U.S. Army may someday cause injury by misusing
their information. Employing the doctrine of standing, the Court dismissed the claim and held that
plaintiffs did not sufficiently demonstrate that that they were "immediately in danger of sustaining a
direct injury as a result of [the U.S. Army's] action" and, therefore, could not "invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of [the] action") (citation omitted); see Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (explaining that SCOTUS employed the doctrine of
standing and held that a group of doctors had "sufficiently [demonstrated a] direct threat of personal
detriment" to review an abortion statute even though it had been enacted but not yet taken effect at
the time the action was filed); but see United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197
(1956) (explaining that SCOTUS concluded that the broadcasters had standing to sue, and incorporated the doctrine of ripeness as well in its analysis when it states that jurisdiction "depends upon
standing to seek review and upon ripeness").
101. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 172 (1987).
102. Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Considerationin Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 477,
491 n.64 (1958).
103. Id. at 477.
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because it declined to do so. " As such, the First Circuit did not address
this issue. l10
It is noteworthy that the First Circuit did not provide an analysis of
the doctrine of standing in order to differentiate it from the doctrine of
ripeness in the context of this case. 1° 6 In New Hampshire Right to Life
PoliticalAction Committee v. Gardner,the First Circuit stated that "the
doctrine of standing, though vitally important for federal courts, remains
a morass of imprecision."107 In Rhode Island Association of Realtors v.
Whitehouse, the First Circuit acknowledges that "standing and ripeness
may substantially overlap."'0 8 "The imbrication is nowhere more apparent than in pre-enforcement challenges.""° In Gastronomical Workers,
there is a pre-enforcement challenge.110 The Gastronomical Workers
court's premise is that the matter is ripe because the Fund did suffer an
injury."' The premise then contends that since said injury is not speculative, it is ripe."1 Notwithstanding, the Court admits that the IRS could
later grant the funding waiver. 1 3 If the IRS grants the funding waiver, the
employees would not have an injury. 1 4 Thus, the injury is not concrete.
Concrete injuries are injuries that have harmed a party or parties and have
not been remedied." 5 As such, a ripeness argument is apropos.

104. See generally United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not
like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs."); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 (1938) (dissenting opinion) ("No constitutional question was suggested or argued below or here. And as a general
rule, this Court will not consider any question not raised below and presented by the petition. Here it
does not decide either of the questions presented but,. changing the rule of decision in force since the
foundation of the Government, remands the case to be adjudged according to a standard never before
deemed permissible.") (citation omitted); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 604,
605 (1936) ("No application has been made for reconsideration of the constitutional question there
decided... [the State of New York] is not entitled and does not ask to be heard upon the question
whether the Adkins case should be overruled."); Esselstyn v. Casteel, 288 P.2d 215, 217 (Or. 1955)
("The court can only decide questions that are before it.").
105. Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d. 54, 6062 (1st Cir. 2010).
106. Id.
107. N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1996)..
108. R.I. Ass'n of Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1999).
109. Id.
110. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d. at 58.
111. Id. at 61.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Nichol, Jr., supra note 101, at 172.
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The CBA Defense

With regard to the employer's next argument, the collective bargaining agreement defense, the Court engages in cherry picking"1 6 when it says
that "[t]he Plan cannot contract around [ERISA]."' 17 First, the Second
Circuit in Esden v. Bank of Boston is referring to specific sections of
ERISA, none of which are Section 302, which is the subject matter at issue
in Gastronomical Workers.118 Moreover, the Second Circuit is basing its
opinion on sections of the statute that are not pertinent to the claim rather
than relying on a contract law argument. 19
Ironically, the First Circuit accuses the employers of belaboring the
point that the duty to contribute to a pension plan is contractual in nature
yet surprisingly the First Circuit makes no attempt at a contract law analysis. 120 With regard to the employers' defense of pointing to the contract,
the First Circuit holds that "[t]his suit is not an action to collect under, or
enforce, the CBA. Rather, it is an action to garner the amounts needed to
satisfy ERISA's minimum funding requirement."'' This argument is circulus in demonstrando(circular reasoning),122 as it relies on a premise to
assume the truth of the conclusion instead of supporting it.123 The Fund
is arguing that the CBA protects them from having to satisfy ERISA's
124
minimum funding requirement due to the circumstances in this case.
To summarize the Court's reasoning: The Fund's contractual argument is
irrelevant because this suit is not about contracts, it is about satisfying a
minimum funding requirement. Since this suit is about satisfying

116. MILOS JENICEK, How To THINK MEDICINE, REASONING, DECISION MAKING, AND
COMMUNICATION IN HEALTH SCIENCES AND PROFESSIONS 530 (2018) (ebook) (defining that cherry
picking as the act of pointing at individual cases or data that seem to confirm a particular position,
while ignoring a significant portion of related cases or data that may contradict that position).
117. Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2000).
118. Id. at 172 n.23 ("Title I of ERISA governs the 'Protection of Employee Benefit Rights.'
Each of the ERISA sections on which we rely appears in Title 11") (emphasis added); Gastronomical
Workers, 617 F.3d at 62.
119. Esden, 229 F.3d at 173 ("See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D) (documents and instruments governing
plan may only be enforced insofar as they 'are consistent with the provisionsof [ERISA Titles I and
IV].')") (emphasis added).
120. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d. at 62.
121. Id.at 63.
122. DOUGLAS N. WALTON, PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT IN EVERYDAY CONVERSATION 206 (1992)
("A is true because B is true; B is true because A is true. "Wellington is in New Zealand. Therefore,
Wellington is in New Zealand.").
123. Id.
124. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 58.
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the Fund is required to satisfy the miniminimum funding requirements,
125
requirement.
funding
mum
The Court completely ignores the Fund's argument. 126 The Fund is
arguing to enforce the CBA because it is claiming that it has met its obligations. 127 The Fund is simply stating that they have already fulfilled this
obligation and should not be required to do so again. 128 Ultimately, the
Court holds that ERISA supersedes the CBA in question but it does not
elucidate its syllogism for how it came to this determination. 129
c.

Trustee Mismanagement

The third argument advanced by employers is that the funding deficiency is caused by trustee mismanagement.13 ° The Court claims that trustee mismanagement is irrelevant when deciding funding deficiency issues."' The First Circuit opines that 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(1) lays out the
factors for determining funding deficiencies, and trustee mismanagement
is not listed. 32 However, the Court does not specify the factors and how
they are not applicable. 13 3 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(1) states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amount of any contribution required by this section (including any required installments under paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 10830) of this title or under section
employer responsible for mak1085a(f) of this title) shall be paid by the,
134
ing contributions to or under the plan.
There is not a canon of construction that interprets 29 U.S.C. §
1082(b)(1) to mean that an employer has to make a contribution after it
initially does so.135 Statutory interpretation begins with a plain reading of
125. See Gastronomical Workers, 617 F.3d at 58-59, 63.
126. Id. at 62.
127.

Id.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 62-63.
130. 1d. at 63.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. ("ERISA sets forth a specific set of computations that must be made to determine
whether a funding deficiency exists. See 29 U.S.C. § .1082(b). Those computations do not include
investigations into the propriety of how the fund is managed.").
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(1) (2012).
135.

Max Birmingham, Whistle While You Work: InterpretingRetaliation Remedies Available

to Whistleblowers in the Dodd-FrankAct,13 FLA. A & M U. L. REv. 1, 15 (2017) ("If a court performs
statutory interpretation without a canon of construction, it is admitting that there is no legal basis for
its interpretation.").
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the statute. 136 Since there is no defmitive text on liability for employers
after they make the required installment under 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(1),
contrary to what the First Circuit claims, 137 statutory interpretation must
shift to the aforementioned sections referenced.138 Section 1083(j)(3)(A)
states, in part, "[i]n any case in which the plan has a funding shortfall for
the preceding plan year, the employer maintaining the plan shall make
Under Section
the required installments under this paragraph ... .
10836), the meaning of the term "required installment" is open to various
interpretations, as it is not explicitly defined. 4 ° Section 1083(j)(C)(ii)
provides a set date for payments of the required installments (first payment is April 15; second payment is July 15; third payment is October 15;
fourth payment is January 15 of the following year).' Under a noscitur
a sociis ("a word is known by the company it keeps")142 canon of construction interpretation, the required installment obligations of employers
14 3
is met once they make the full payments on each of these dates.
Section 1085a(f)(3)(A) states "[t]here shall be 4 required installments for each plan year"'144 and cites the same four dates as Section
1083(j)(C)(ii). 145 "Shall" is generally imperative or mandatory when it is
used in statutes, contracts, or the like. 146 In the instant matter, a plain
136. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820) ("The case must be a strong one indeed,
which would justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning ofwords.... in search of an intention
which the words themselves did not suggest.").
137. Gastronomical Workers, 617 F.3d at 64.
138. Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(j)(3)(A) (2012).
140. U.S.C. § 1083(k)(6)(B) states: "The terms "due date" and "required installment" have the
meanings given such terms by subsection (j)." Nevertheless, the meaning of "required installment"
under U.S.C. § 10820) is open to interpretation.
141. 29 U.S.C § 1083(j)(C)(ii) (2012).
142. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 195 (2012).
143. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 10830)-1083(k) (2012).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1085(a)(f) (2012) (emphasis added).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(j)(3)(C)(ii) (2012).
146. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 561 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 35 & 438, 170 N.W.2d 433, 440 (Minn.
1969); People v. O'Rourke, 13 P.2d 989, 992 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) ("In common, or ordinary
parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term 'shall' is a word of command, and one which has
always, or which must be given a compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a peremptory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of excluding
the idea of discretion, and has the significance of operating to impose a duty which may be enforced,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning, or when addressed to public officials, or where
a public interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised
or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears; but the context ought to be very strongly persuasive
before it is softened into a mere permission, etc."); County of Los Angeles v. Cal., 222 P. 153, 156
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923); Stockton Plumbing & Supply Co. v. Wheeler, 229 P. 1020, 1023 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
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reading of the statute draws the following conclusion: The employers have
an obligation to fund the required installments on the four dates, as per the
CBA,14 7 but do not have an obligation to do so at any other time, much
less a duty to make a required installment to cure a funding deficiency
14 8
from previous years.
-. It is presumable that trustee mismanagement would play a part in the
analysis of a funding deficiency. 49 SCOTUS has ruled that under ERISA
any exercise of authority or control gives rise to fiduciary status. 5 ' This
definition includes trustees. 5 ' Legislative history also suggests that trustees are fiduciaries under ERISA. 5 2 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch (hereinafter "Firestone"), SCOTUS acknowledged the potential
problem for self-interested fiduciaries.' 5 3 ERISA's exclusive benefit rule
mandates fiducianes to act "solely.in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and.., for the exclusive purpose of: ... providing benefits
to participants and their beneficiaries..... ".154Moreover, the Court holds
that a "conflict [of interest] must be weighed as it'facto[r] in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion."'' " Thus, one would think trustee
mismanagement would play a part in the analysis of a funding defi-

ciency. 116
It is a rather hypocritical stance of the First Circuit to cite other
ERISA sections in its explanation of rejecting the Fund's CBA argunient, 157 and then ignore an entire ERISA section dedicated to trustee prin158
ciples as the court rejects the Fund's-trustee mismanagement argument.
ERISA section 405(a) determines the liability for trustees. 59 The First

147. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(j)(3)(C)(i) (2012).
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1083(j)(3)(A)-1083(j)(3)(C)(ii) (2012).
149. Gastronomical Workers Local Union 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 6364 (1st Cir. 2010).
150. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1993).
151. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.,Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
152. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 5075 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038.
153. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
.
TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)).
154. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 §404(a)(1); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (2012).
155.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115 (citation omitted).

156. Gastronomical Workers Local Union 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 6364 (1st Cir. 2010).
157.
158.

Id.
Id.

159.

See ERISA

§ 405(a).
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Circuit also blatantly ignores the legislative history of ERISA that fiduciary principles are not just explicit but are also implicit.'6 0
d. The Vanishing Deficiency
With regard to the employer's fourth and final argument, the vanishing funding deficiency was not in existence at the time of the district
court's order.16 1 The First62Circuit discerns that the Federal District Court
1
did not rule on this issue.
The Court remarks that if there was no longer a deficiency, the Federal District Court's award would constitute "double-dipping" on the part
of the trustees. 163 The Court remarks that the Fund's 2006 Form 5500
indicated that there was no funding deficiency at that time of the Federal
District Court's award. 164 The trustees assert that "the withdrawal liability
payments in this case were earmarked for the 2006 and 2007 plan years
and, thus, had no effect on the funding deficiency for the 2005 plan
year." 165 The First Circuit disagreed with this statement, and remanded
the case to the Federal District Court to determine whether a funding de66
ficiency existed.1
The First Circuit also issued the Federal District Court to consider
another issue on remand: whether the trustees may be granted relief under
ERISA § 502(a)(3), under which the trustees brought suit. 1 67 The First
Circuit raised the question as to whether the relief sought was equitable

160. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 5083 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (proclaiming "that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature
and purpose of employee benefit plans.").
161. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 64.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 65.
165. Id.
166. Id. ("Given the rolling nature of ERISA accounting, this seems counter-intuitive; but in any
event, the record is tenebrous as to how the additional payments were applied. Moreover, the cogency
of the documentary evidence depends in large part on inference and interpretation. To complicate
matters, the district court did not inquire into the subject. This is a mystery, wrapped in a riddle,
tucked inside an enigma. The only thing that we can say with assuranceis that the employers have
raised genuine issues of materialfact about the continued existence of the funding deficiency and
about the appropriatenessof the remedy - issues that demand further inquiry.") (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 66-67 ("For the reasons elucidated above, we vacate both the dollar-certain judgment
and the order denying relief under ERISA section 502(g)(1). We affirm the order denying relief under
ERISA section 502(g)(2). We remand the case to the district court. On remand, the district court
should conduct such further proceedings, consistent with this opinion, as it deems desirable to develop
the record in the necessary respects. If the court determines that the trustees are entitled to prevail, it
shall fashion whatever equitable relief may be appropriate.").
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relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3), since SCOTUS has ruled that compelling
68
defendants pay money to plaintiffs are usually legal rather equitable.'
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF OTHER ERISA SECTIONS, AS WELL As
OTHER SIMILAR STATUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW

A. •Other ERISA Sections
1. Top Hat Plans
Principles of contract law, as opposed to ERISA's fiduciary standards, govern top hat plans. 6 9 Top hat plans are unfunded pension benefit
plans that are "maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of
providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or
highly compensated employees." 7 ° Top hat plans are not subject to
ERISA's vesting, 171 funding,1 72 and fiduciary responsibility require-

ments. 173 Withal, the Second Circuit concludes that this is "because Congress deemed top-level management, unlike most employees, to be capa74
ble ofprotecting their own pension expectations."'
If top-level management is capable of protecting their own pension
plans and benefit plans, then it is logical to deduce that unions negotiating
CBAs are capable of protecting pension plans and benefit plans of their
constituents. 175 With regard to negotiating CBAs, one scholar states that
"[iln an ongoing bargaining relationship, the party who commands the
default position has the advantage. The party with the advantage can

168. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 64 ("[T]he Supreme Court has stated that '[a]lmost
invariably ...suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant
to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for "money damages," as that phrase has traditionally
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's
breach of legal duty. And "[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief."'") (citations omitted).
169. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bayer Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 473,478 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing
how courts, in top-hat benefit plans like the one in the case at hand, "apply principles of contract law
in determining the rights of participants"); see also Pereira v. Cogan, 200 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Gallione v. Flaherty, 70 F.3d 724, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1995).
170. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(2012).
171. Id.; see also Gallione, 70 F.3d at 725.
172. ERISA § 301; see also Gallione, 70 F.3d at 724-25.
173. ERISA § 401; see also Gallione, 70 F.3d at 724-25.
174. Gallione, 70 F. 3d at 727 (emphasis added).
175. See Stephen B. Goldberg, CoordinatedBargainingTactics of Unions, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
897, 898 (1969).
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prevail on a particular issue by either excluding language unfavorable to
its interests or by including language favorable to its interests. 176
B. SimilarStatutes
1. Labor Management Relations Act
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (hereinafter
"LMRA") provides a cause of action for violations of a CBA between an
employer and union. 177 This statute transforms a state common law claim
178
into a federal claim.
While LMRA Section 301(a) is very similar to ERISA Section
502,79 they are two distinct labor laws. In the Conference Report of
ERISA Section 502, Congress acknowledges this:
[W]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan which do not involve application of the
title I provisions, they may be brought not only in U. S. district courts
but also in State courts of competent jurisdiction. All such actions in
Federalor State courts are to be regardedas arising under the laws of
the United States in similarfashion to those brought under section 301
of the Labor-ManagementRelations Act of 1947.180

Principles of contract law govern LMRA Section 302.181 When a
claim under LMRA Section 302 is made, courts first look to the language
of the contract. 8 2 If the contract has plain language, the analysis ends
there. 183 If the contract is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic
176. James B. Zimarowski, Interpreting Collective BargainingAgreements: Silence, Ambiguity
and NLRA Section 8(d), 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 465, 470 (1988).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012).
178. Id. (showing that the Labor Management Relations Board does not deprive state courts of
jurisdiction in actions brought thereunder); see also Charles Dowd Box Co. Inc. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. 502, 514 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) (showing
the importance for state courts to follow and apply federal law); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).
179. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(2012); see also Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV.
631, 635, 640 (1994) (explaining the similarities between LMRA and ERISA).
180. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5107 (emphasis added).
181. Moore v. Menasha Corp., 690 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2012).
182. Id. at 451 ("[W]c look first to the CBAs' explicit language for clear manifestations of the
parties' intent.... If, however, the plain language is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we
then consider extrinsic evidence to supplement the parties' intent.").
183. Id.
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evidence to support the contention of the parties as to what the ambiguity
means.184 Where lifetime vested healthcare benefits following retirement
are at issue and "were agreed upon pursuant to a union-negotiated con'
In this
tract," an LMIRA claim creates a "derivative ERISA claim."185
particular instance, courts look to whether "the promise was negotiated
via collective bargaining," if the plan is a "product of collective bargaining ...[the court] applies 'ordinary principles of contract interpretation."' 18 6 Therefore, it follows that principles of contract law may indeed
govern ERISA as applied to negotiated collective bargaining agree87
ments. 1
C. Principlesof Trust Law
SCOTUS has explained that the intent of Congress in enacting
ERISA is to protect employees from the mismanagement of funds for their
benefit plans and pension plans.'8 8 This concern arose from Congressional investigations into union corruption, which unearthed cronyism,
kickbacks, and looting in benefit plans and pension plans. 8 9 In response,
Congress imposes fiduciary standards analogous to those in trust law. 9 0
A major premise in trust'law is that fiduciaries are disinterested.191
While Congress may have explicitly stated that contracts may also apply, 192 a reason they chose to refrain from doing so is because contracting
parties are expected to be self-interested.' 93 Perhaps there was concern
that the trustees would not be a contracting party, and they could sidestep
liability. 94 While a trustee may have a duty of loyalty,' 95 a duty of care,1 96
and a duty of prudent administration' 97 backed by personal liability if
184. Griesmann v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 776 F.2d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 1985).
185. Moore, 690 F.3d at 450.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 450,458.
188. Massachusettsv. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989).
189. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1324.
190. Id.; see Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., 763-F. App'x. 470,474 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing IUE-CWA
v. GE, 745 F. App'x 583, 599 (6th Cir. 2018) ("I can only conclude that we have failed to heed 'the
principles of ERISA that command us to honor the fundamental duties of the law of trusts.'); see
also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
191. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115.
192. See id.
193. John H. Langbein, The Supreme CourtFlunks Trusts, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 207, 223 (1990).
194. John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 635
(1995).
195. Id. at 655; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959).
196. Langbein, supra note 194, at 657.
197. Id.at 656.
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there is a breach, 98 it can be sidestepped if the trustee only agrees to serve
if the fiduciary obligations are relaxed or if there are exculpatory
clauses. 199 However, under ERISA, fiduciary responsibility is enhanced
since it covers actions and authority, 2 0 as well as voiding exculpatory
clauses.2 0 1

While Congress acknowledges that trustees or fiduciaries may make
decisions that lead to investment losses, the concern is the process of the
decision. 20 2 Congress wants to ensure that the decision was made with
pure intentions.2 °3 As a remedy, a fiduciary who breaches one of ERISA's
"make good.., any losses to the plan resulting from
fiduciary duties must
' ,204
breach.
such
each
While "ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust
law, 20 5 we see that there are sections of ERISA that are abound with the
language and terminology of contract law.20 6 If trust law can guide the
ERISA sections that are apropos, it is reasonable to have contract law
20 7
guide the ERISA sections that are apropos.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW APPLIED IN

A.

ERISA CASES

Principlesof ContractLaw

In Firestone, SCOTUS comments that before ERISA was enacted

principles of contract law governed disputes over employee benefits. 20 8 It
is further explained that in the case of a dispute, the court would first look

198.

See Langbein, supra note 194, at 659-60.

199. Id.
200. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 3(21)(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (2012); see PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW

16,110 (2010).
201. See ERISA § 410(a); see WIEDENBECK, supra note 200, at 124-25.
202. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980); see S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 29 (1974)
(noting that ERISA modifies traditional trust law's settlor instructions, which states that "if the settlor
specifie[d] that the trustee shall be allowed to make investments which might otherwise be considered
imprudent" because Congress finds this is "insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries"); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 12 (1973).
203. See Amato, 618 F.2d at 567.
204. ERISA § 409(a).
205. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
206. See ERISA § 3(18) (discussing adequate consideration); see also ERISA §406 (showing the
sections of ERISA that contain language and terminology of contract law).
207. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-13 ("Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits before the enactment of ERISA were governed by principles of contract law.").
208. Id. at 112 ("The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA.").
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at the plain language of the contract, and then if there was any ambiguity
it would turn to the intentions of the parties.2 0 9 The FirestoneCourt goes
on to explain that ERISA was enacted "to protect contractually defined
benefits."2 ' The overriding legal theory in which SCOTUS based the
Firestoneopinion on is trust law.211 The Firestoneopinion has come under heavy criticism from both the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit,212 the U.S. Solicitor General," 3 and scholars,2 14 who all argue that SCOTUS should have applied principles of contract law to the
case."' Moreover, the Firestone decision stated specific sections of
ERISA in which trust law would be apropos. 2 16 This does not, however,
mean that contract law cannot guide sections of ERISA if it is apropos.217
At its core, ERISA is based upon principles of contract law.218 In
Rud v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. ofBoston, Plaintiff brought suit seeking
209. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-13 ("If the plan did not give the employer or
administrator discretionary or final authority to construe uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any other contract claim - by looking to the terms of the plan and
other manifestations of the parties' intent.") (citations omitted).
210. Id. (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)) (emphasis
added).
211. Id. at 111 ("In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under
§ 1 132(a)(1 )(B), we are guided by principlesof trust law.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
Neither general principles of trust law nor a concern for impartial decisionmaking, however, forecloses parties from agreeing upon a narrower standard of review. As this case
aptly demonstrates, the validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to
turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue. Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to
be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan.
Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
212. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 147 (1987) ("We suggest several
principles of contractual construction which we believe will be relevant in the proceedings to come.").
213. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 15, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) ("The objectives of the statute are best served by resolving
questions of plan interpretation under established principles of contract interpretation.").
214. Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The FoundationalInsufficienciesfor Deferential Review in Employee Benefit Claims - Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
147, 149; see also HENRY H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS LAW AND PRACTICE 126 (1990)

("Once a common law contract right exists, ERISA may dictate contract terms or standards for determining breach and affording remedies different from those applicable under common-law contract
doctrines.").
215. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 147; Brief for the Respondents, supra note
213, at 15; Bogan, supra note 214; PERRJTT, supra note 214.
216. FirestoneTire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at l1l.
217. Id.
218. James P. Baker, The Decline and Fall of Equitable Defense Under ERISA, A.B.A. (May
22, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business -aw/publications/blt/2014/05/04-baker/
("Signaling the importance of ERISA plan language in any ERISA analysis, the Sereboffdecision
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insurance benefits and argued that Defendant had a conflict of interest.2 19
"He argues that a conflict of interest exists because any money Liberty
Life pays to a claimant reduces its profit.- 22' The Seventh Circuit rejects
this argument and holds that "[t]here is doubtless some truth in these critiques, but their acceptance would destabilize large reaches of contract
law, ofwhich ERISA is, after all, a part, since it neither requires employers
to establish welfare and pension plans nor prescribes the terms of such
plans. 2 2'
Since the inception of the doctrine of contract law, courts have
largely ignored the bargaining power asymmetries.2 22 This is because
courts presume that contracting parties are self-interested.2 23 If an employer performs its obligations under the CBA by paying, it will have
complied with the condition exactly as stipulated.22 4 Under contract law,
courts rarely require exact compliance since "the law abhors a forfeiture., 225 In GastronomicalWorkers, the employers made the payments as
directly stated in the CBA. 226 Furthermore, SCOTUS has held that parties
to a CBA are not required to perform beyond the plain language of the
contract. 227 In Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., the Appellant-union went
on strike, and in response the employer stopped making contributions to
a welfare and retirement fund, asserting that the union had violated its

begins with the plan's terms. For Chief Justice Roberts, the medical plan acted properly by enforcing
its repayment provision because it 'followed the money.' This holding indicatesthat because ERISA
plans are in essence contracts, a court can apply equitable remedies to enforce their terms.") (emphasis added).
219. Rud v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 438 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).
220. Id. ("The ubiquity of such a situation makes us hesitate to describe it as a conflict of interest.

There is no contract the parties to which do not have a conflict of interest in the same severely attenuated sense, because each party wants to get as much out of the contract as possible. How serious the
conflict is depends on circumstances.").
221. Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
222. Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedural Unconscionabilityand the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 925, 927 (2006).
223. Langbein, supra note 194, at 223.
224. See, e.g., Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Resort & Country
Club, 476 F. Supp. 2d 99, 106 (D.P.R. 2007) ("This dispute is therefore not about ... the CBAs at all

. . . [but rather] obligations under ERISA, which clearly states that Defendants must adequately fund
the Pension Fund they have agreed to sponsor.").
225. UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 360 (1999); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The policy favoring freedom of contract requires that, within broad limits . . ., the agreement of the parties should be honored even though forfeiture results. When, however, it is doubtful whether or not the agreement makes an event a condition
of an obligor's duty, an interpretation is preferred that will reduce the risk of forfeiture.").
226.
227.

GastronomicalWorkers, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1960).
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contract.2 28 SCOTUS rejected this argument; citing the plain language of
the contract, it held that parties to a collective bargaining agreement agree
to what is expressed in the contract, therefore the parties must perform
what is provided unequivocally in the agreement.22 9 Contract law should
govern contract disputes, even if the claim is brought under ERISA. 3 °
B. Case Law
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
a.

Plain Meaning Rule

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (hereinafter
"Sixth Circuit") has applied the plain meaning rule2 31 to a dispute over a
CBA. In Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., an unpublished opinion, the Court first
looks to see if the CBA in dispute is written in the plain language of the
CBA.232 In Zino, employees brought suit under ERISA and the LMRA
over claims that they were owed healthcare benefits. 233 After a number'of
acquisitions, Defendant-Whirlpool Corp. was the party responsible for
providing said healthcare benefits. 234 Whirlpool Corp. announced significant reductions to healthcare benefits, and the employees sued.2 35
The Sixth Circuit observes that nowhere in the CBA is there language to be found that requires the Defendant to do what the Plaintiffs
seek remedy for.2 36 The Court even opens the door for the possibility bf

228. Lewis, 361 U.S. at 462-64.
229. Id. at 470-71.
230. But see GastronomicalWorkers, 476 F'Supp. 2d at 106-07 (holding that ERISA essentially
had the ability to override the general laws of contracts where pension funds are concerned).
231. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 142, at 195 (describing the Plain Meaning Rule).
232. Zino v. Whirlpool, 763 F. App'x 470, 472 (6th Cir. 2019) ("We look first to what each
contract says; if its plain language lacks ambiguity, we stop there.").
233. Id.at471.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 472 ("Here, none of the CBAs contain such language; they state that the company
will pay insurance premiums 'in accordance with the terms and conditions of the [Welfare Benefit]
Plan,' that retirees 'shall have the opportunity to continue' healthcare coverage, or that coverage for
retirees 'shall be' for 'pre-65 coverage only.' None of these statements says clearly and affirmatively
that the relevant general durational clause doesn't control the termination of healthcare benefits whether by reference to the general durational clause itself or by other language stating explicitly that
healthcare benefits continue past the relevant agreement's expiration. And nowhere else in any of the
CBAs does such language appear. This means the general durational clauses control the termination
of Whirlpool's obligation to provide healthcare benefits to plaintiffs, which means the obligation
ended when the last CBA expired.").
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arguing that the Defendant is obligated to provide the healthcare benefits
23 7 The Court
sought if the contract is ambiguous or lacks plain language.
remarks that the Plaintiffs made the argument that the CBA does not contain plain language, but it found the argument unpersuasive. 238 This reaffirms that courts should always first interpret contracts according to the
plain meaning rule, whether there are claims brought under ERISA or any
other law, statute, rule, or regulation.2 39
b.

Public Policy

The key issue in Shelter Distribution,Inc. v. GeneralDrivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 89 (hereinafter "Shelter Distribution") is whether, under ERISA Section 410, it is repugnant to public policy for a union to indemnify an employer in a CBA for any contingent
withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980 (hereinafter "MPPAA").24 ° Under ERISA, as amended by
the MPPAA, an employer who either partially or completely withdraws
from a multiemployer pension plan is subject to withdrawal liability for a
portion of the plan's unfunded pension benefits. 241 The CBA provision
states, in part:
The Union and the members of the Bargaining Unit have agreed that
only the liability of the Company to the [pension plan] are, have been
and shall be limited to the actual contributions it makes during the course
of the past, present and future Contracts, and the Company shall not be
liable for any other obligation or contingent obligation of any kind or
nature whatsoever. The Union shall indemnify the Companyfor any contingent liability which may be imposed under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980.242

237. Zino, 763 F. App'x at 472 ("And this threshold requirement is just that: a threshold. If a
CBA does unambiguously disconnect certain benefits from the agreement's general durational clause,
the agreement might well vest those benefits - even absent clear vesting language. Or ambiguity as
to vesting might exist. To make the call, a court would need to examine any 'clues' that 'spring from
the CBA.' Although plaintiffs point to a number of clues they say show that the parties intended to
vest healthcare benefits, those clues carry no clout here because no CBA unambiguously disconnects
healthcare benefits from the governing general durational clauses. And that means the CBAs unambiguously do not vest lifetime healthcare benefits, which ends our inquiry.") (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 472.
239. See id. (explaining that if the plain language of the contract lacks ambiguity, the analysis is
simple).
240. Shelter Distribution Inc. v. Gen. Drivers Local Union, 674 F.3d 608, 609 (6th Cir. 2012).
241. See id. at 610, 612.
242. Id. at 610.
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The Plaintiff demanded indemnification from the Union for its portion of the withdrawal liability, citing the indemnification provision in the
CBA.2 43 In response, the Union argued that the MPPAA established public policy which prohibits employers and unions from shifting withdrawal
liability through a negotiated CBA.244
The Court looked at the plain language of the CBA and held that the
indemnification provision does not violate public policy.24 5 The Union
did not argue that the contract was ambiguous, invalid, or that the employers were avoiding their contractual duties.2 46 Instead, tle Union relied on
a public policy argument. 247 The Court did not find this argument persuasive. 248 The Court reasoned that there is no logical difference between the
employers making a contract with the union or another party for the indemnification provision, 249 and blazons "it would be illogical to interpret
the statute as prohibiting indemnification agreements which accomplish
the same thing. 2 5 °
The Sixth Circuit's analysis focuses entirely on public policy. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held that a CBA, in which a union indemnified
an employer for any contingent liability to a multiemployer pension plan
established under ERISA, does not violate public policy. 25 1 Although the

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 613 ("Under the agreement, the Union is the entity analogous to the insurance company described in section 1110(b). Here, as in Pfahler, there is no violation of section 1110(a) because
there was no shifting of the financial liability under the agreement: Shelter was still financially liable
to the Fund and the company satisfied its financial obligation. Under the indemnification provision,
the Union simply agreed to reimburse Shelter for any financial liability it would incur should any
contingent liability be imposed by the pension plan. Thus, we hold that Section 8(m) of the collective
bargaining agreement between Shelter and the Union is not a violation of any 'well defined and dominant' public policy.").
246. Id. at 610.
247. Id. ("During arbitration, the Union argued that Section 8(m) was unenforceable because it
violated public policy. The Union asserted that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
established a public policy prohibiting employers and unions from shifting withdrawal liability
through a negotiated collective bargaining agreement because such a shift defeats the purpose of the
statute.").
248. Seeidat613.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 612.
251. Id. at 613 ("Because the collective bargaining agreement does not violate public policy, we
AFFIRM the decision of the district court.").
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Court notes that it is a matter of first impression,2 52 the Third Circuit ruled
25 3
on a similar case and came to the same conclusion as the Sixth Circuit.
In GastronomicalWorkers, the Court does not examine the contract
at issue to ascertain whether it is in plain language nor does it examine the
language of the statute it emphasizes its reasoning on.254 The Court
acknowledges that the employers fulfilled their contractual obligations. 5
The Court simply states the employers have a statutory obligation to cure
the funding deficiency.25 6 It is noted that nowhere in the statute does it
require employers to cure funding deficiencies. 257 Dissimilar to the First
Circuit in GastronomicalWorkers, the Sixth discusses that the contract is
valid and that there is no explicit language in the statute that prohibits the
provision at issue. 258 There is no explicit language in the statute cited in
Gastronomical Workers that employers are obligated to cure funding deficiencies. 9
V.

REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM

A.

Unjust Enrichment
1. "Simple Expedient of Sharp Bargaining"

Contract law is based on the principle that agreements parties freely
enter into will be enforced by courts because "the will of the parties... is
252. Shelter Distribution Inc., 674 F.3d at 609-10; see also Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: MakingPersuasivePolicyArguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REv. 59,65 n.34 (2001)
(quoting Judith S. Kaye, State Courts and the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1995)) ("[S]tate court judges, when dealing with
issues of first impression or filling in gaps, are frequently left to choose among competing policies.").
253. Shelter DistributionInc., 674 F.3d at 610-11.
254. See supra Section II(A)(i).
255. Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 62
(1st Cir. 2010) ("Because the employers paid these contributions as required under the CBA, this
argument runs, they have no further payment responsibilities notwithstanding the occurrence of an
accumulated funding deficiency.").
256. Id. ("The statutory obligation is independent of whatever arrangements private agreements
may contemplate.").
257. See supra Section II(A)(ii)(C).
258. Shelter DistributionInc., 674 F.3d at 612-13 ("If Congress thought that an employer should
not be able to contractually obligate a third party to indemnify it for any financial responsibility incurred under ERISA, the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act would
likely have amended section 1110 ofERISA to prohibit the insurance provisions of section 1110(b).").
259. See GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 62 (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) with respect to employers curing funding deficiencies); but see Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974, § 302(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) (2012) ("A plan to which this part applies shall
satisfy the minimum funding standard applicable to the plan for any plan year.").
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something inherently worthy of respect."26 It is expected that contracting
parties are self-interested.2 61 In GastronomicalWorkers, the First Circuit
reasons that the CBA does not apply because the "parties could elude
ERISA's commands by the simple expedient of sharp bargaining. '' 262
Ironically, a party was able to elude their contractual obligations due to
their bargaining skill. The employers were forced to pay for the funding
deficiency even though they already made all of their contractual payments. 263 The First Circuit ultimately concluded that employers contributing to a multi-employer pension plan have an obligation, mandated by
section 302 of ERISA, to cure a funding deficiency, even if to do so requires contributions beyond those set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement. 2 4
The reasoning of the Court in Gastronomical Workers with regard to
"sharp bargaining" is subject to reductio ad absurdum.265 If contracting
parties are self-interested,26 6 it is reasonable to infer that the parties bargained for their consideration. It is reasonable to infer that the employers
made concessions during the negotiation process in order to gain the considerations they prioritized. While the GastronomicalWorkers Court held
that the employers were sharp bargainers,26 7 it is the Fund that were the
sharp bargainers. The Fund may have made a concession to the employers
260. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 272 (1986).
261. Meredith R. Miller, ContractLaw, PartySophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MONT.
L. REv. 493-94 (2010) ("An ever growing body of case law and scholarship has fashioned a rigid
dichotomy between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties in a wide array of contract inquiries.
Courts mention party sophistication in determining whether the parties intended to form a contract
and what they meant by the terms they used. They determine the enforceability of reliance disclaimers, exculpatory clauses and liquidated damages provisions based, at least in part, on party sophistication. Courts also reference sophistication in determining whether a party can avoid a contract on
the grounds of mistake or fraud.").
262. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 62.
263. Id. ("The CBA in effect here contains an employer-specific, dollar-specific schedule of such
contributions. Because the employers paid these contributions as required under the CBA, this argument runs, they have no further payment responsibilities notwithstanding the occurrence of an accumulated funding deficiency. We agree with the employers that pension contribution obligationsare
contractual in nature. But this tenet does not exist in a vacuum. Whatever a private contract may
provide, ERISA continues to govern employers' funding obligation with respect to covered pension
plans.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
264. Id.
265. See id. ("Were the rule otherwise, parties could elude ERISA's commands by the simple
expedient of sharp bargaining. This result, intolerable in itself, also would frustrate one of ERISA's
primary goals: to ensure that covered pension plans provide employees promised retirement benefits.").
266. See Miller, supra note 261, at 495 (noting that courts presume that sophisticated parties are
aware of the terms of their contracts and that they bargained for them).
267. See Gastronomical Workers, 617 F.3d at 62 (suggesting that if the employers only had to
stick to the agreement they could avoid ERISA's obligations through "sharp bargaining").
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and used this as bargaining leverage and then relied on the court to overturn this part of the negotiation, holding it invalid.2 68 Thus, the Fund has
been unjustly enriched by having the employers forced to perform an obligation that they did not agree to in the contract.269 If a party is forced to
perform beyond the plain language of an enforceable contract, the other
party or parties will reap the rewards of unjust enrichment.2 7 ° The principle of unjust enrichment is "[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at
the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other., 27 1 The
principle of unjust enrichment is subject to wide interpretation, as the
main purpose is corrective justice.272 Black's Law Dictionary defines unjust enrichment as:
1. The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected. 2. A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and
not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution
or recompense. 3. The area of law dealing with unjustifiable benefits of
this kind.273
It is absurd to hold that a contract or contract provision is unenforceable because one of the parties had negotiating leverage.2 74 If this reasoning were to be extrapolated, parties to contracts would simply argue they
negotiated from a weaker position and thus the contract is unenforceable. 75 Contracts would then be unenforceable.
268. See Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
149, 150 (1983) ("The concept of 'negotiating power' is more difficult. If I have negotiating power,
I have the ability to affect favorably someone else's decision. This being so, one can argue that my
power depends upon someone else's perception of my strength .... ").
269. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1937) (stating how a party who receives an overpayment from another party beyond what was agreed to would be unjustly enriched if they kept such
payment).
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. See Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REv. 283,
284 (1992) ("[U]njust enrichment posits that wrongly or unjustly secured gains must be annulled...
[T]he principle offers little guidance to a common law judge.").
273. Unjust Enrichment,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
274. See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. Sci. 201, 202-03 (1957) ("A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do."); see also
Fisher, supra note 268, at 150 (discussing how power may be used in negotiations to affect another
person's decisions).
275. See James W. Kuhn, David Lewin & Paul J. McNulty, Neil W. Chamberlain:A Retrospective Analysis of His Scholarly Work and Influence, BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 143, 143-44 (1983) ("We
may define bargaining power (of A, let us say) as being the cost to B of disagreeingon A's terms
relative to the costs of agreeingon A's terms ... Stated in another way, a (relatively) high cost to B
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Moreover, the Gastronomical Workers Court engaged in judicial activism 27 6 by alleging that the contract provision was unenforceable but did

not give a legal reason as to why it was unenforceable. "Sharp bargaining" is not a legally sufficient reason to explain why a contract or contract
provision is unenforceable. 277 The Gastronomical Workers Court concealed its judicial activism27 8 by not providing a legal reason as to why
the contract provision is unenforceable such as lack of capacity, 279 duress,28 ° undue influence,2 8 ' misrepresentation,28 2 nondisclosure,28 3 unconscionability,284 public policy,285 mistake, 286 impossibility, 287 inter alia.
2.

Statutory Requirement

In support of the reasoning in Benedict Coal, Representative Frank
Thompson, Jr. (D-NJ) remarked that the purpose of ERISA Section 515
is to "permit trustees of plans to recover delinquent contributions efficaciously, and without regard to issues which might arise under labor-man"
He further added
agement relations law - other than 29 U.S.C. 186. 1288
that the costs of delinquent payments by employers to benefit and welfare
plans:
of disagreement with A means that A's bargaining power is stiong. A (relatively) high cost of agreement means that A's bargaining power is weak. Such statements in themselves, however, reveal nothing of the strength or weakness of A relative to B, since B might similarly possess a strong or weak
bargaining power. But if the cost to B of disagreeing on A's terms is greater than the cost of agreeing
on A's terms, while the cost to A of disageeing on B's terms is less than the cost of agreeing on B's
terms, then A's bargaining power is greater than that of B. More generally, only if the difference to
B between the costs of disagreement and agreement on A's terms is proportionately greater than the
difference to A between the costs of disagreement and agreement on B's terms can it be said that A's
bargaining power is greater than that of B.").
276. JudicialActivism, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A philosophy of judicial
decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors,
to guide their decisions.").
277. See Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54,
62 (1st Cir. 2010) (mentioning "sharp bargaining").
278. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in JudicialActivism?, 73
U. COLO. L. REv. 1401, 1401 (2002) (stating that judicial activism is "empty, a mask for a substantive
position").
279.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.§§ 174-175.
Id. § 177.
Id. § 164.
Id. § 161.
Id. § 208.
Id. § 178.
Id. §§ 151-152.
FederalPolice Power Turns to the Postal Clause, 5 FoRDHAM L. REV. 302, 322 (1936).
126 CONG. REC. 23,039 (1980).
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detract from the ability of plans to formulate or meet funding standards
and adversely affect the financial health of plans. Participants and beneficiaries of plans as well as employers who honor their obligation to
contribute in a timely fashion bear the heavy cost of delinquencies
in the
289
form of lower benefits and higher contribution rates.
ERISA Section 515 states:
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargainedagreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law,
make such contributions in accordance
with the terms and conditions of
290
such plan or such agreement.
In GastronomicalWorkers, there is no language in the contract that
says the employers are responsible to cure funding deficiencies. 291 The
Court engaged in judicial activism again when it claimed that there is a
statutory requirement to do so, even though the statute does not state
this.29 2 Additionally, the Court neither cites nor acknowledges ERISA
Section 515, which is the statutory requirement that states employers must
make payments according to the collective bargaining agreement.293
The First Circuit also falsely claims that parties cannot contract
around ERISA. 294 The Williston contract treatise states that parties are
free to contract around the law, unless it harms the public or the renunciation affects the rights of a non-contracting party or parties. 295 Throughout history, courts have opined that contracts between private parties

289.

126 CONG. REC. 23,039 (1980).

290. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145
(2012).
291. Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 62
(Ist Cir. 2010).
292. Max Birmingham, Whistle While You Work: InterpretingRetaliation Remedies Available
to Whistleblowers in the Dodd-FrankAct, 13 FLA. A&M U. L. REv. 1, 6 (2017) ("There are three
salient methods in which courts execute judicial activism: (1) rule that a law is unconstitutional; (2)
the canon of constitutional doubt (use precedential opinions to find incompatibilities which create
doubt); and (3) misconstrue the statute to claim it should be interpretedin a manner that is consistent
with thejudge 's personalpolicy preference.") (emphasis added).
293. See generally Gastronomical Workers, 617 F.3d at 62-63 (dismissing ERISA Section 515
arguments).
294. Id. at 62.
295.

11 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 30:24 (4th ed. 1999).
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should be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the contract, so as
to not disrupt the rights of parties.29 6
B. Trustee Mismanagement
The First Circuit's reasoning and holding in Gastronomical Workers
is subject to reductio ad absurdum.297 Shockingly, the First Circuit completely ignored the argument that the employers should not be held liable
for curing the funding deficiency since it was caused by mismanagement
of the trustees.2 98 The Court maintains that under ERISA, mismanagement does not factor into the computations as to whether there is a funding
2 99
deficiency.
Under the Court's reasoning, employers could face limitless liability
for trustee mismanagement. 3" Since the Court opines that trustee mismanagement is not a factor in determining who should cure a funding deficiency, it is possible that trustees could mismanage and cause a funding
deficiency.3 ' Employers would then be liable to cure the deficiency. The
First Circuit did not consider how many times trustees caused a funding
deficiency.3" 2 Theoretically, trustees could game the system and take advantage of an employer.30 3 Trustees can cause funding deficiencies numerous times, and each time the employer would be liable to cure the
funding deficiency. 3 4 Trustees, then, have no concern since they are not
296. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801) ("It is true that in mere private
cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will,
by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties ....); Farouki v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp.,
63 F. Supp. 3d 84, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2014), affid 608 F. App'x. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Holzsager v. D.C.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 979 A.2d 52, 57 (D.C. 2009).
297. Reductio AdAbsurdum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY (10th ed. 2014) ("In logic, disproof of
an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion."); Max Birmingham, PaidIn Full:
Interpretingand Defining "Market Value" Under the Lacey Act, 25 ANIMAL L. REV. 125, 145-48
(2018) (discussing the absurd results that will occur if courts accept arguments that laypersons did not
understand the law); Max Birmingham, Strictlyfor the Birds: The Scope of Strict Liability Under the
MigratoryBird Treaty Act, 13 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 1, 16 (2017) (discussing when a court
departed from a plain meaning interpretation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA") based on
reductioad absurdum arguments).
298. GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3dat 61, 63-64.
299. Id. at 63.
300. See generally id. (mentioning that the ERISA "computations do not include investigations
into the propriety of how the fund is managed" trustees never face liability and employers are always
on the hook).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See generally id. (noting that none of the ERISA computations include an investigation into
how the funds were managed by trustees).
304. Id. at 61, 63-64.
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responsible and can take on as much risk as they want. 3 5 Then there
would be a funding deficiency that employers would be liable to cure,
even though they are not responsible for said funding deficiency.3" 6
C. Preemption of ContractLaw Claims Under ERISA
Holding that trustee mismanagement cannot be computed in determining a funding deficiency leads to reductio ad absurdum, as employers
would have no legal recourse since ERISA preempts contract law
claims.3" 7 In the case of Gastronomical Workers, the employers claim
that they are within the contract and that the root cause of the funding
deficiency is trustee mismanagement. 30 8 However, due to ERISA's complete preemption doctrine,30 9 employers are prevented from litigating their
common-law claims, including contract claims, in state courts. 3 10 As is
the case of Gastronomical Workers, the employers cannot bring forth a
claim of trustee mismanagement as breach of contract, thus leaving the
employers without a way to seek remedies.31 1 Under the reasoning of the
First Circuit, then, the trustees are free to breach the contract and cannot
be held liable under ERISA.3 12

305. See generally GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 63 (mentioning that trustee mismanagement of funding is not included in the ERISA computation as to whether a "funding deficiency exists").
306. See generally id. at 63-64 ("In short, allegations of trustee mismanagement should be raised
in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. They play no role in the decisional calculus in this suit over a
funding deficiency.").
307. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 60 (1987) ("The question presented by this
litigation is whether these state common law claims are not only pre-empted by ERISA, but also
displaced by ERISA's civil enforcement provision ... ,to the extent that complaints filed in state
courts purporting to plead such state common law causes of action are removable to federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).") (citations omitted).
308. See GastronomicalWorkers, 617 F.3d at 61.
309. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) ("ERISA's pre-emption
provision was prompted by a recognition that employers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with a task of coordinating complex administrative activities. A patchwork
scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which
might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to
refrain from adopting them. Pre-emption ensures that administrative practices of a benefit plan will
be governed by only a single set of regulations.").
310. See id.; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62 (holding that respondent is preempted from
bringing "common law contract and tort claims" by ERISA).
311. See Gastronomical Workers, 617 F.3d at 63-64 ("[A]llegations of trustee mismanagement
should be raised in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. They play no role in the decisional calculus in
this suit over a funding deficiency.").
312. See id.
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"In enacting ERISA, Congress' primary concern was with the mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the
failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated funds."31 3 It follows,
therefore, that preventing employers from bringing claims of trustee mismanagement, and holding employers liable for said mismanagement, directly contradicts congressional intent behind ERISA.31 4
CONCLUSION

Principles of contract law should govern ERISA Section 302. If principles of contract law govern ERISA Section 302, employers may pursue
remedies for trustee mismanagement. 315 If courts apply principles of contract law to ERISA Section 302, then they can also apply the plain meaning rule. 316 The plain meaning rule was first adopted by courts to combat
faulty memory and dishonesty.3 17 Unfortunately, faulty memory and dishonesty are present in modem times, as the New York Court of Appeals
promulgates that the plain meaning rule brings "stability to commercial
transactions by safeguarding against fraudulent claims, perjury, death of
witnesses ... infirmity of memory ... [and] the fear that the jury will
improperly evaluate the extrinsic evidence."3'18
GastronomicalWorkers' ruling that employers need to perform beyond the plain meaning of the contract leads to reductio ad absurdum.3 '9
The recipient of the performance will come into unjust enrichment, since
said party is the beneficiary of said performance without having to give
bargained-for consideration in return.3 20
If a contract is unambiguous, courts need an extraordinary reason or
reasons to come to an interpretation that affects the rights of the parties.
313. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989).
314. See id. ("In enacting ERISA, Congress' primary concern was with the mismanagement of
funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated funds.").
315. See supra Section V(C) (discussing ERISA's preemption of contract law claims).
316. See supra Section IV(A) (discussing the plain meaning rule).
317. See The Countess of Rutland's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 89, 90 (K.B. 1604), 5 Co. Rep. 25b (Gr.
Brit.).
318. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990).
319. See supra Section V.
320.

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("[I]t is the

essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive
or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the
relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise."). Justice Holmes also stated that consideration "must not be confounded with what may be the
prevailing or chief motive in fact." Id.
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If the First Circuit applied principles of contract law in its Gastronomical
Workers analysis, the court would have first looked at the language of the
contract to determine if it is ambiguous on its face.321 If the court did a
proper analysis and found the contract to be unambiguous, then it would
have based its reasoning and opinion on the plain language of the contract.
If courts issue opinions that employers deem unfair, there is a pragmatic effect that employers will not offer benefit plans or pension plans.3 22
In various areas of the law, scholars apply an economic analysis to evaluate the rationales for the effects of legal rules.323 With regard to contract
law, scholars have come to conclude that legal rules proselytize efficient
markets.32 4 In contrast, with regard to statutory law, scholars claim that
legal rules and statutory requirements do not promote market efficiency.3 2 5 ERISA does not require employers offer benefit plans or pension plans.3 26 Employers are free to bargain these types of compensation,
but it is not mandated. 327 The Seventh Circuit posits that if employers
want to lower labor costs, they will offer "lower wages or promised lower
benefits from the start.'32 8 It would be sagacious to expect employers to

321. See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576, 580 (N.Y. 1969)
(noting that "extrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its face," so the plain meaning of the words
should control the interpretation of the contract).
322.

See CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE As WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE

AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 7-8 (1997) (noting that American employers have a vast amount of discretion when it comes to determining if, and which, benefit plans they will provide to their employees).
323. See id.
324. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
325. Id. at 312 (claiming that statutory requirements are usually enacted in response to parties
who demand regulation because they will profit from it).
326. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Careand the Constitution:PublicHealth and the Role ofthe
State in the FramingEra, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 274-75 (1993) (discussing how the United
States government is not obligated to ensure that its citizens have adequate healthcare protection).
327. Id. at 329.
328. Rud v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 438 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We have
pointed out that given reasonably well-informed employees, an employer cannot reap a long-ran benefit from reducing welfare benefits, whether directly or by delegating administration to a hard-nosed
insurance company. The employee's total compensation package includes benefits as well as wages;
reducing any component reduces the total. If the employer could have met its labor needs with a
cheaper compensationpackage, it would have paidlower wages or promised lower benefitsfrom the
start. There would have been no need to incur the bother and uncertainty of trying to "stear' contracted-for benefits through the back door. This analysis can be criticized as reflecting too sunny a
view of the operation of labor markets, assuming as it does that employees have such good information that they cannot befooled in the fashion suggested and that employers are always in for the
long haul and therefore always cultivate a reputationfor fair dealing with employees. Employees,
the argument continues, might be less quick to blame their employer for an adverse benefits decision
by an insurance company, albeit a company that had been retained by the employer, than they would
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offer lower wages, promised lower benefits, or possibly even not offer
benefits at all, if there is a feeling that they will not be given a fair chance
at litigating issues they feel strongly about.

the employer itself, if the employer were the plan administrator.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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